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Book Review
The Method and Some Findings of
Anthropological Jurisprudence*
F. S. C. Northrop**
Anthropological, or sociological, jurisprudence affirms the
thesis that positive law cannot be understood apart from its relations to the particular culture or society out of which it grows
or to which it is applied. When the content of the norms specified in the positive law are reinforced by the content of the
norms embodied in the culture or the social behavior of the
society, positive law is effective; when this is not the case, it
tends, as Ehrlich emphasized, to become ineffective. Ehrlich
called this underlying cultural or sociological factor the "living
law" to distinguish it from the positive law. He defined the
living law as "the inner order of the associations" of the individual people making up the society. What Ehrlich called the
"inner order of the associations," the anthropologists call the
"pattern of a culture."
One of the main problems of anthropological and sociological
jurisprudence becomes that, therefore, of specifying the method
by which the inner order of the living law or the ethical content of the pattern of a culture is to be specified. The first.major
contribution of Professor Hoebel's recent book, The Law of Primitive Man, is that in its first chapter it describes this method.
Quite independently, in his study of the living law of Continental
Europe in its bearing on the proposed positive legal constitutions of Continental European Union, this reviewer came upon
the same method.' This method involves a specification of the
qualitative norms held in common by a given people in a given
area and the quantitative support which each set of norms enjoys.
*

Review of THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN, A

STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL

DYNAMICS, by E. Adamson Hoebel. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.
Pp. viii, 357.
** Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The author is gratefully indebted to
the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc., for grants which
have made this study possible.
1. NORTHROP, EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY cc. 3,
6. 7, 8 (1954).
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Thus the living law of a given society is specified by the method
of sociological or anthropological jurisprudence when the set
of postulates of that particular culture or society is indicated
and that set is shown to enjoy the acceptance and support of
most, but never all, of the people. Thus Professor Hoebel points
out that for an anthropologist, "the measure of integration of
[any] culture" will be given by the "consistency between basic
postulates and . . . the specific selected behavior patterns" ' 2 and
that the norm as specified by the basic postulate set is both a
description of what is and a quantitative concept. He writes:
"Norm, in its statistical sense, is a strictly neutral term. It
merely expresses what is, on the basis of a numerical count. It
says nothing of what ought to be or what people think ought to
be. It is a quantitative concept."' 3
It is in the quantitative component of the qualitative and
neutral postulate set expressing an is that the oughtness of the
norm finds its origin. When the normative content of a given
postulate set becomes accepted by a statistically large portion
of the people in a society, it transforms itself into an imperative
ought. Then, as Professor Hoebel writes, following Sumner, "in
society what is takes on the compulsive element of ought ....
What
the most do, others should do."'4 In this manner contemporary
anthropology and sociology show how their empirically verified
indicative sentences, concerning the is of a given people's shared
meanings, are turned into imperative sentences by the majority
of the people in their relation to the minority. Sumner's theory
of the relation between indicative and imperative does not explain, however, why the quantitatively large portion of the people accept the is designated by the postulate set of their culture
as an ought for themselves. At this point anthropological and
sociological jurisprudence need to be supplemented with psychological jurisprudence after the manner of Underhill Moore and
Leon Petrazycki.5 We shall return to this point later in con2. Hoebel, p. 14.
3. Ibid.
4. Id.

at 15.

5. See Northrop, Underhill Moore's Legal Science: Its Nature and Significance,

59 YALE L.J. 196 (1950)

and Northrop, review of LEON PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND

MORALITY, translated by Hugh W. Babb, Introduction by Nicholas S. Timasheff,
20th Century Legal Philosophy Series: Vol. VII, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1955, to appear in a forthcoming issue of the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review.
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nection with Professor Hoebel's use of the expression "social
power" and his definition of law.
The second major contribution of Professor Hoebel's book is
by way of illustration of this method of anthropological jurisprudence when applied to the study of seven specific primitive
societies. In each case he spells out the specific postulates and
their corollaries in terms of which the social relations of the
people take on a normative inner order or cultural pattern. These
seven primitive societies are the Eskimo; the Ifugao of the
Philippines; the Comanche, the Kiowa and the Cheyenne Indian
societies of the American Plains; the Trobriand Islanders of the
Southwest Pacific; and the Ashanti of Africa. In each instance
the norms are unique, as are the procedures by which they are
applied. Some of these societies are patriarchal, others matriarchal in their familial living law. In some of these societies
the normative family ties between different generations are
unilateral, moving largely or entirely through the male members or largely or entirely through the female; in one of these
societies, they are bilateral. The procedures for dispute settling
differ also. In some societies mediation is never used - in others
there is usually a "go-between" who serves to bring the disputants together but does not pass judgment, whereas in others
the go-between may at first mediate and then enforce a judgment if the disputants themselves do not come to an agreement.
The latter differences are important. They become accentuated when one compares the patriarchal or matriarchal societies
described by Professor Hoebel with patriarchal or matriarchal
societies of the Buddhist or Confucian cultures. Then it becomes
evident, as this reviewer has indicated elsewhere, 6 that law falls
into three major species, rather than merely the two noted by
Sir Henry S. Maine in his classic work, Ancient Law. These three
species are: (1) The mediational types of dispute settling in
which the resort to codes is regarded as immoral or as a second
best as exemplified by classical Buddhist and Confucian teaching and by the later Gandhi in more recent times. (2) Dispute
settling by law of status rules or codes in which patriarchal or
matriarchal familial relations play a major role, as exemplified
6. Northrop, The Philosophy of Natural Science and Comparative Law, PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, 19521953, Vol. XXVI of the combined proceedings of the several divisions, 5; NORTHROP, THE TAMING OF THE NATIONS 56-65 (1952).
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in all the societies described by Professor Hoebel. (3) Dispute
settling by law of contract codes in which legal norms are broken
free from color of skin, familial or tribal associations and expressed in terms of axiomatically constructed constitutional
utopias whose authority is not tradition but the consent of those
to whom they apply.
Professor Hoebel's anthropological findings show also that
between groups with different norms war occurs and behavior,
which would be outlawed if applied to one's own people, is accepted as quite proper when applied to another tribe or nation.
Also some societies show greater integration and harmony than
others and succeed in settling disputes with less rebellion and
emotional disturbance on the part of the disputants. A comparison of these differences with differences in the respective
postulate sets shows a dependence of the behavioral and practical differences upon the differences in the theoretical assumptions. For example, the Comanche tribe of Plains Indians fails
to achieve the social integration and deference to individual feelings obtained by the Cheyenne Indians. An examination of their
respective postulates shows the former to be excessively individualistic, whereas the latter have stronger interpersonal normative assumptions which prepare the individual members to accept the order necessary for greater social integration and stability with less inclination to private emotional psychological
rebellion. The Kiowa tribe of Indians on the other hand are
mid-way between the extreme individualism and lack of social
coordination of the Comanche and the greater social sense and
collaborative spirit of the Cheyenne. As examination of their
postulate set of assumptions shows them to be ambiguous both
with respect to individualism and to social collaboration. From
this Professor Hoebel concludes, "When cultural goals are not
' 7
clear-cut, it is not likely that social action will be either.
These anthropological materials have several important implications with respect to legal philosophy. The Comanche Indians
treat animals as legal objects.8 This brings into question those
legal theories which affirm every legal relation to be a relation
between persons. There are natural law elements in many of
these societies.9 Professor Hoebel concludes also that primitive
7. Hoebel, 176.
8. Hoebel, 140.
9. Hoebel, 131, 138, 142, 144, 145, 224-225, 264-265.
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peoples legislate ;20 all is not mere frozen custom. He suggests in
Part III that a sociological jus gentium, i.e., what is common to
all social systems, must be defined more in terms of function
than in terms of common, normative content." His description
of a respected and able Cheyenne chief demonstrates that personality structure is a function of the postulate set of beliefs of
a given people. 12 This shows that a natural law jurisprudence
must refer to "the essential nature of man" with considerable
caution. Certainly these case studies establish the main point
of anthropological and sociological jurisprudence which is that
the positive law is meaningless by itself and can be understood
only in connection with the implicit postulate set of the culture
or the society which is its background.
Professor Hoebel's book as a whole divides into three major
parts: I, The Study of Primitive Law; II, Primitive Law-ways;
and III, Law and Society. Part II contains the aforementioned
anthropological materials. Part III draws several general conclusions. Part I includes, in addition to the aforementioned
Chapter 1 on the method of determining the inner order of the
living law, three chapters on (1) what law is, (2) the methods
and techniques for studying its relation to the cultural assumptions of any people, and (3) the legal concepts of Hohfeld as a
tool of the empirical anthropologist in his study of the law of
primitive peoples. Some queries need to be raised with respect
both to the definition of law in Chapter 2 and to the cultural
anthropologists' application to primitive societies of Hohfeld's
technical legal concepts which are described in Chapter 4.
The Hohfeldian concepts are the product of the abstract technical analytic form of scientific philosophical and legal thinking
which characterizes one particular group of legal philosophers
in the Anglo-American modern West. If, as Professor Hoebel's
empirical studies in Part II demonstrate, no people in any culture can be correctly understood in conceptual terms other than
their own, is it not dangerous for the cultural anthropologist to
approach primitive cultures through the Hohfeldian conceptual
spectacles of traditional Anglo-American legal theory? As the
anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown writes in his article,
"Patrilineal and Matrilineal Succession," to which Professor
10. Hoebel, 167.
11. Hoebel, 285-291.
12. Hoebel, 145.
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Hoebel refers, "If we are to understand aright the laws and customs of non-European peoples we must be careful not to interpret them in terms of our own legal conceptions, which, simple
and obvious as some of them may seem to us, are the product
of a long and complex historical development and are special to
'13
our own culture.
The aforementioned query becomes the more pointed when
one notes Professor Hoebel's unexpected departure from his
usual sober objectivity in his chapter on the Trobriand Islanders.
Instead of proceeding to specify their basic postulate set and
the way it operates in settling their disputes, we are confronted
in the very first sentence of the very first paragraph with
Malinowski rather than with Malinowski's anthropological subject matter, the Trobriand Islanders. As one reads beyond the
first paragraph, the concern with Malinowski turns into a
criticism and the criticism seems to be tinged more with emotion
than supported by evidence. Something in Malinowski's account
of the Trobriand Islanders seems to be emotionally disturbing
Professor Hoebel for reasons that are not made clear. Why this,
the only, departure from sober objectivity to be found in the entire volume?
Usually when anyone is emotionally disturbed by a professional colleague it is well to see if the colleague has not presented
some evidence which brings into question certain assumptions
of the disturbed person. What is the thesis of Malinowski, based
on his study of the Trobriand Islanders, which Professor Hoebel
criticizes with touches of feeling? It is that in Malinowski's book
on these people, "the reader is definitely given to believe that
law operates without the aid of physical force, although it does
bind behavior. ' 14 This reviewer must confess that the evidence
given by Malinowski seems convincing. Moreover, Professor
Hoebel's own material in his chapters on other primitive peoples
supports the Malinowski thesis that in some cases, at least, force
is not the source of legal sanction. In the case of the Ashanti, to
give but one example, Professor Hoebel writes that "the thought
that his ancestors are watching him... is a very potent sanction
of morality." '5 Many similar examples occur in Professor Hoebel's data.
13. 20 IOWA L. REv. 286 (1935).
14. Hoebel, 181.
15. 1-oebel, 217.
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Why then does he become so disturbed by Malinowski's similar conclusion? Why does he brush Malinowski off rather
brusquely by quoting Seagle to the effect that Malinowski is
guilty of "the pathetic fallacy of primitive jurisprudence" which
consists in "transfer [ring] to primitive law the legal emotions
of his own culture."' 16 The answer to these questions is not far
to seek. It is to be found in Professor Hoebel's definition of law
in Chapter 2, a definition which, like his Hohfeldian concepts,
he brought to his anthropological studies. This definition he describes in the last paragraph of Chapter 2 as follows: "[L]aw
may be defined in these terms: A social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the!
applicationof physical force by an individual or group possessing
the socially recognized privilege of so acting."'7
The source of this definition is well known to students of
modern legal theory. It is the basic thesis of both the eighteenth
century legal idealists, such as Kant, and nineteenth century
and early twentieth century legal positivists, such as Austin or
Hohfeld. According to these thinkers, what distinguishes law
from morality is that whereas the sanction for morality is in
the ethical content of the moral norm and the internal acceptance
of that moral content as binding by the moral individual, the
source of the sanction for law is external physical force or
power. Naturally, therefore, Professor Hoebel was slightly disturbed emotionally when Malinowski brought forth facts which
were difficult to reconcile with Professor Hoebel's preconceived
definition of law. Having himself committed the pathetic fallacy
by accepting a definition of law peculiar to his own Anglo-American culture and held only by some schools of legal thinkers in
that culture, one need hardly wonder that Professor Hoebel was
pushed out of his normal sober objectivity when Malinowski confronted him with facts that brought that definition into question.
Professor Hoebel's error is the more remarkable in that he
is an anthropological jurist. Certainly the major contribution
of anthropological and sociological jurisprudence to contemporary legal theory is its demonstration that instead of positive law getting its sanction from the power it attaches to itself,
the positive law only succeeds in attaching power to itself when
the ethical content of its norms correspond to that of the inner
16. Hoebel, 181.
17. Hoebel, 28.
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order of the underlying living law. As the self-reformed legal
positivist, Professor A. L. Goodhart, has recently written: "It
is because a rule is regarded as obligatory that a measure of
coercion may be attached to it: it is not obligatory because there
is coercion."'1 8 In his first chapter and at many other places in
his book, Professor Hoebel implicitly asserts this theory, only
to allow his uncritical acceptance of the Hohfeldian and Austinian positivistic definition of law to force him to throw away
this,, the major, contribution of anthropology to contemporary
legal science.
Petrazycki has shown conclusively that the difference between law and morality does not center in the sanction for the
former being external force and the sanction for the latter being
internal personal commitment to the ethical content of the norm,
but centers instead in the fact that ethical commitment to a
moral norm is merely unilateral whereas in the case of a legal
norm it is bilateral. By unilateral, Petrazycki means that in the
moral relation between A and any object B, A merely places an
obligation upon himself while ascribing no right to B to conduct
on A's part in accordance with the obligation which A places
upon himself. By bilateral, Petrazycki means that when A commits himself to a legal obligation, this carries with it the converse right of B to demand behavior on A's part in accordance
with the ethical obligation which A places upon himself. 1
In any event, it is difficult to believe that, if Professor Hoebel
had put his case studies first and allowed his findings as a
cultural anthropologist to determine his definition of law instead of committing the pathetic fallacy of uncritically assuming
a definition of law peculiar to one or two schools of legal thinking in his own Anglo-American culture, he would have come
out with a different definition of law in Part III of his volume
than appears at the end of Chapter 2 in Part I. Also the chapter
on the Trobriand Islanders could have been solely on the Trobriand Islanders.
The foregoing critique should be kept within a proper sense
of proportion. It is likely that the ambiguity of the book with
respect to what it means by the words "social force" or "social
18. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 17 (1953).
19. PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY, translated by Hugh W. Babb, Introduc-

tion by Nicholas S. Timasheff, VII 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1955). See also note 5 8upra.
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power" results from the failure of its author and most legal
thinkers of the recent past to give a semantic analysis of these
abstract nouns. Clearly the expressions "social power" or "social
force" are metaphors. As Petrazycki has shown, their reification into a concrete entity is one of the major errors of the theory
of law of Kant, the Hegelian idealists and the British legal positivists. Clearly society is not a concrete entity; it is a theoretical
construct. The same is true of a society's "power."
This becomes evident when one notes that the biological
bodies of the individual person in any society are not tied to one
another by rods of steel or bones or muscles or tissues to generate a single concrete entity or organism with its physical power
after the manner in which the organs of the human body are
tied together by bones and muscles and tissues to generate the
concrete entity which is the individual person's biological body
with its physical power. As Professor Hoebel's own studies make
clear, there is no society or culture with power except as a statistically large majority of its members share common meanings
and norms for ordering their relations to one another. From this
it follows necessarily that power is an effect of these commonly
shared meanings and norms, specified in Professor Hoebel's
postulate sets of the cultures he describes. Furthermore "power"
receives its existence, effectiveness and sanction from those commonly shared meanings and hence cannot be the sanction for
the ethical content of the positive or the living law.
These considerations show that nothing is more needed in
the contemporary world than a semantic analysis of the words
"social power" and "national power." Contemporary students,
not merely of law, but of foreign policy and international relations are still laboring under the semantic error of reifying
these abstract words into a concrete entity with results that may
well be tragic for the whole of contemporary humanity. In his
final chapter, "The Trend of the Law," Professor Hoebel points
up the obvious need to extend positive legal norms and institutions from the domestic to the international field. "The science
of comparative legal dynamics," he writes, "is called upon to add
its catalytic effect to the crystallizing metamorphosis from primitive law to modern on the plane of world society. ' 20 If this
"trend" is to reach "fulfillment," cultural and positive legal
20. Hoebel, 333.
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norms must find the source of their effectiveness and their sanction in their ethical content. Force between nations cannot be
brought under ethical and legal control if the sanction for the
ethical content of legal norms is force. Such a theory of law
makes force King.
The reader should not allow these qualifications to distract
his attention from Chapter 1 and Part II of Professor Hoebel's
book. The content of these portions of his volume is exceedingly
important. Providing, therefore, that the reader discounts the
pre-conceived ideas of Chapters 2 and 4 of Part I, which Professor Hoebel brings a priori to his anthropological findings, and
allows the empirical findings of Part III to speak for themselves,
he will find this a rewarding and a trustworthy book.

